#CARD:AFGHANISTAN:BACKGROUND NOTES BACKGROUND NOTES: AFGHANISTAN PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE JULY 1994 Official Name: Islamic State of Afghanistan PROFILE Geography Area: 648,000 sq. km. (252,000 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than Texas. Cities (1993 est.): Capital--Kabul (est. 800,000). Other cities--Kandahar (226,000); Herat (177,000); Mazar-e-Sharif (131,000); Jalalabad (58,000); Konduz (57,000). Terrain: Landlocked; mostly mountains and desert. Climate: Dry, with cold winters and hot summers. People Nationality: Noun and adjective--Afghan(s). Population: 17.7 million (1993 estimate, including about 1.4 million refugees in Pakistan and 2 million refugees in Iran). Annual growth rate: 2.5% (1993 est.). Ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Aimaq, Turkmen, Baluch, Nuristani. Religions: Sunni Muslim 84%, Shi'a Muslim 15%. Languages: Pashto, Dari (Afghan Persian). Education: Years compulsory--6. Literacy--about 29%. Health: Infant mortality rate (1993)--169 /1,000. Life expectancy (1992 est.)--45 yrs. (male); 43 yrs. (female). Work force: Mostly in rural agriculture; number cannot be estimated due to conflict. Government Type: Afghanistan identifies itself as an "Islamic state." Independence: August 19, 1919 (from U.K.). Organization: Interim government is a presidential system with a prime minister and cabinet. Political parties: The 10 major Afghan political factions are largely based on the former resistance organizations. About half are Islamist in orientation; the other are more traditional or secular. President Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) and Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) have been bitter rivals for political influence in Afghanistan. Flag: Adopted in 1992, the flag has three horizontal bands--green, white, and black--with the great seal of Afghanistan superimposed on the bands. Economy GDP: $3 billion (1991 est.). Natural resources: Natural gas, oil, coal, copper, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron, salt, precious and semiprecious stones. Agriculture (at least 65% of GDP): Wheat, corn, barley, rice, cotton, fruit, nuts, karakul pelts, wool, mutton. Industry (estimated 20% of GDP): Small-scale production for domestic use of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, and cement; handwoven carpets for export. Trade (1992 est.): Exports--$1 billion: carpets, rugs, fruit and nuts, natural gas, cotton, oil-cake, karakul. Major markets--Central Asian Republics, EEC, India, Pakistan. Imports--$1.7 billion: petroleum products, sugar, manufactured goods, edible oils, tea. Major suppliers--Central Asian Republics, Japan, Singapore, France, India, Pakistan. 1994 market exchange rate: 2,400 Afghanis=U.S. $1. PEOPLE Afghanistan's ethnically and linguistically mixed population reflects its location astride historic trade and invasion routes leading from Central Asia into South and Southwest Asia. Pashtuns are the dominant ethnic group, accounting for about 38% of the population. Tajik (25%), Hazara (19%), Aimaq (6%), Uzbek (6%), Turkmen (2%), and other small groups are also represented. Dari (Afghan Persian) and Pashto are official languages. Dari is spoken by more than one-third of the population as a first language and serves as a lingua franca for most Afghans. Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen are spoken widely in the north. More than 70 other languages and numerous dialects are also spoken by smaller groups throughout the country. Afghanistan is an Islamic country. An estimated 84% of the population is Sunni; the remainder is predominantly Shi'a, including Isma'ilis, Hazaras, and the Qizilbash. Despite attempts during the years of communist rule to secularize Afghan society, Islamic practices still pervade all aspects of life. Likewise, Islamic religious tradition and codes provide the principal means of controlling personal conduct and settling legal disputes. Excluding urban populations in the principal cities, most Afghans are divided into clans and tribal groups, which follow centuries-old customs and religious practices. HISTORY Afghanistan, often called the crossroads of Central Asia, has had a turbulent history. In 328 BC, Alexander the Great entered the territory of present-day Afghanistan, then part of the Persian Empire, to capture Bactria (present-day Balkh). Invasions by the Scythians, White Huns, and Turks followed in succeeding centuries. In AD 642, Arabs invaded the entire region and introduced Islam. Arab rule quickly gave way to the Persians, who controlled the area until conquered by the Turkic Ghaznavids in 998. Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030) consolidated the conquests of his predecessors and turned Ghazni into a great cultural center as well as a base for frequent forays into India. Following Mahmud's short- lived dynasty, various princes attempted to rule sections of the country until the Mongol invasion of 1219. The Mongol invasion, led by Genghis Khan, resulted in the destruction of many cities, including Herat, Ghazni, and Balkh, and the despoliation of fertile agricultural areas. Following Genghis Khan's death in 1227, a succession of petty chieftains and princes struggled for supremacy until late in the 14th century, when one of his descendants, Tamerlane, incorporated Afghanistan into his own vast Asian empire. Babur, a descendant of Tamerlane and the founder of India's Moghul dynasty at the beginning of the 16th century, made Kabul the capital of an Afghan principality. In 1747, Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of what is known today as Afghanistan, established his rule. A Pashtun, Durrani was elected king by a tribal council after the assassination of the Persian ruler Nadir Shah at Khabushan in the same year. Throughout his reign, Durrani consolidated chieftainships, petty principalities, and fragmented provinces into one country. His rule extended from Mashhad in the west to Kashmir and Delhi in the east, and from the Amu Darya (Oxus) River in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south. All of Afghanistan's rulers until the 1978 Marxist coup were from Durrani's Pashtun tribal confederation, and all were members of that tribe's Mohammadzai clan after 1818. European Influence Collision between the expanding British and Russian Empires significantly influenced Afghanistan during the 19th century. British concern over Russian advances in Central Asia and growing influence in Persia culminated in two Anglo-Afghan wars. The first (1839-42) resulted not only in the destruction of a British army, but is remembered today as an example of the ferocity of Afghan resistance to foreign rule. The second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-80) was sparked by Amir Shir Ali's refusal to accept a British mission in Kabul. This conflict brought Amir Abdur Rahman to the Afghan throne. During his reign (1880-1901), the British and Russians officially established the boundaries of what would become modern Afghanistan. The British retained effective control over Kabul's foreign affairs. Afghanistan remained neutral during World War I, despite German encouragement of anti-British feelings and Afghan rebellion along the borders of British India. The Afghan king's policy of neutrality was not universally popular within the country, however. Habibullah, Abdur Rahman's son and successor, was assassinated by members of an anti-British movement in 1919. His third son, Amanullah, regained control of Afghanistan's foreign policy after launching the Third Anglo-Afghan war with an attack on India in the same year. During the ensuing conflict, the war-weary British relinquished their control over Afghan foreign affairs by signing the Treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919. In commemoration of this event, Afghans celebrate August 19 as their Independence Day. Reform and Reaction King Amanullah (1919-29) moved to end his country's traditional isolation in the years following the Third Anglo-Afghan war. He established diplomatic relations with most major countries and, following a 1927 tour of Europe and Turkey--which had seen modernization and secularization under Attaturk--introduced several reforms intended to modernize the country. Some of these, such as the abolition of the traditional Muslim veil for women and the opening of a number of coeducational schools, quickly alienated many tribal and religious leaders. The weakness of the army under Amanullah further jeopardized his position. He was forced to abdicate in January 1929 after Kabul fell to forces led by Bacha-i-Saqao, a Tajik brigand. Prince Nadir Khan, a cousin of Amanullah's, in turn defeated Bacha-i-Saqao in October of the same year. With considerable Pashtun tribal support, Khan was declared King Nadir Shah. Four years later, however, he was assassinated in a revenge killing by a Kabul student. Mohammad Zahir Shah, Nadir Khan's 19-year-old son, succeeded to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. In 1964, King Zahir Shah promulgated a liberal constitution providing for a two-chamber legislature to which the king appointed one-third of the deputies. The people elected another third, and the remainder were selected indirectly by provincial assemblies. Although Zahir's "experiment in democracy" produced few lasting reforms, it permitted the growth of unofficial extremist parties of both left and right. This included the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had close ideological ties to the Soviet Union. In 1967, the PDPA split into two major rival factions: the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and supported by the military, and the Parcham (Banner) faction led by Babrak Karmal. The split reflected deep ethnic, class, and ideological divisions within Afghan society. Zahir's cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud, served as his Prime Minister from 1953 to 1963. During his tenure as Prime Minister, Daoud solicited military and economic assistance from both Washington and Moscow and introduced controversial social policies. Daoud's alleged support for the creation of a Pashtun state in the Pakistan- Afghan border area heightened tensions with Pakistan and eventually resulted in Daoud's dismissal in March 1963. Daoud's Republic (1973-78) and the April 1978 Coup Amid charges of corruption and malfeasance against the royal family and poor economic conditions caused by the severe 1971-72 drought, former Prime Minister Daoud seized power in a military coup on July 17, 1973. Daoud abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as its first President and Prime Minister. His attempts to carry out badly needed economic and social reforms met with little success, and the new constitution promulgated in February 1977 failed to quell chronic political instability. Seeking to exploit more effectively mounting popular disaffection, the PDPA reunified with Moscow's support. On April 27-28, 1978, the PDPA initiated a bloody coup which resulted in the overthrow and death of Daoud and most of his family. Nur Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, became President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Opposition to the Marxist government emerged almost immediately. During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA brutally imposed a Marxist-style "reform" program which ran counter to deeply rooted Islamic traditions. Decrees advocating the abolition of usury, changes in marriage customs, and land reform were particularly misunderstood and upsetting to highly conservative villagers. In addition, thousands of members of the traditional elite, the religious establishment, and the intelligentsia were imprisoned, tortured, or murdered. Conflicts within the PDPA also surfaced early and resulted in exiles, purges, imprisonments, and executions. By the summer of 1978, a major revolt in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan spread into a country-wide insurgency. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, who had earlier been the Prime Minister and minister of defense, seized power from Taraki after a palace shootout. Over the next two months, instability plagued Amin's regime as he moved against perceived enemies in the PDPA. By December, party morale was crumbling, and the insurgency was growing. The Soviet Invasion The Soviet Union moved quickly to take advantage of the April 1978 coup. In December 1978, Moscow signed a new bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan, and the Soviet military assistance program increased significantly. The regime's survival increasingly was dependent upon Soviet military equipment and advisers as the insurgency spread and the Afghan army began to collapse. By October 1979, however, relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were tense as Hafizullah Amin refused to take Soviet advice on how to stabilize and consolidate his government. Faced with a deteriorating security situation on December 24, 1979, large numbers of Soviet airborne forces, joining thousands of Soviet troops already on the ground, began to land in Kabul under the pretext of a field exercise. On December 26, these invasion forces killed Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal, exiled leader of the Parcham faction, as Prime Minister. Massive Soviet ground forces invaded from the north on December 27. Following the invasion, the Karmal regime, although backed by an expeditionary force of about 120,000 Soviet troops, was unable to establish authority outside Kabul. As much as 80% of the countryside, including parts of Herat and Kandahar, eluded effective government control. An overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime, either actively or passively. Afghan freedom fighters (mujahidin) made it almost impossible for the regime to maintain a system of local government outside major urban centers. Poorly armed at first, in 1984 the mujahidin began receiving substantial assistance in the form of weapons and training from the U.S. and other outside powers. In May 1985, the seven principal Peshawar-based guerrilla organizations formed an alliance to coordinate their political and military operations against the Soviet occupation. Late in 1985, the mujahidin were active in and around Kabul, launching rocket attacks and assassinating high government officials. The failure of the Soviet Union to win over a significant number of Afghan collaborators or to rebuild a viable Afghan army forced it to bear an increasing responsibility for fighting the resistance and for civilian administration. Soviet and popular displeasure with the Karmal regime led to its demise in May 1986. Karmal was replaced by Muhammad Najibullah, former chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD). Najibullah had established a reputation for brutal efficiency during his tenure as KHAD chief. As Prime Minister, though, Najibullah was ineffective and highly dependent on Soviet support. Undercut by deep- seated divisions within the PDPA, regime efforts to broaden its base of support proved futile. The Geneva Accords and Aftermath By the mid-1980s, the tenacious Afghan resistance movement--aided by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others--was exacting a high price from the Soviets, both militarily within Afghanistan and by souring the U.S.S.R.'s relations with much of the Western and Islamic world. Although informal negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had been underway since 1982, it was not until 1988 that the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the United States and Soviet Union serving as guarantors, signed an agreement settling the major differences between them. The agreement, known as the Geneva accords, included five major documents, which, among other things, called for U.S. and Soviet non-interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the right of refugees to return to Afghanistan without fear of persecution or harassment, and, most importantly, a timetable that ensured full Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. About 14,500 Soviet and an estimated one million Afghan lives were lost between 1979 and the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Significantly, the mujahidin were neither party to the negotiations nor to the 1988 agreement and, consequently, refused to accept the terms of the accords. As a result, civil war did not end with the Soviet withdrawal, completed as scheduled in February 1989. Instead, it escalated. Najibul-lah's regime, though failing to win popular support, territory, or international recognition, was able to remain in power until 1992. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS The Soviet-supported Najibullah regime did not collapse until the defection of General Abdul Rashid Dostam and his Uzbek militia in March 1992. However, as the victorious mujahidin entered Kabul to assume control over the city and the central government, a new round of internecine fighting began between the various militias, which had coexisted only uneasily during the Soviet occupation. With the demise of their common enemy, the militias' ethnic, clan, religious, and personality differences surfaced, and the civil war continued. Seeking to resolve these differences, the leaders of the Peshawar-based mujahidin groups agreed in mid-April to establish a 51-member interim Islamic Jihad Council to assume power in Kabul. Moderate leader Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was to chair the council for three months, after which a 10-member leadership council composed of mujahidin leaders and presided over by the head of the Jamiat-i-Islami, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, was to be set up for a period of four months. During this six-month period, a Loya Jirga, or grand council of Afghan elders and notables, would convene and designate an interim administration which would hold power up to a year, pending elections. But in May 1992, Rabbani prematurely formed the leadership council, undermining Mojaddedi's fragile authority. In June, Mojaddedi surrendered power to the Leadership Council, which then elected Rabbani as President. Nonetheless, heavy fighting broke out in August 1992 in Kabul between forces loyal to President Rabbani and rival factions, particularly those who supported Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami. After Rabbani convened a highly controversial council to extend his tenure in December 1992, fighting in the capital flared up in January and February 1993. The Islamabad accord, signed in March 1993, which appointed Hekmatyar as Prime Minister, failed to have a lasting effect. A follow-up agreement, the Jalalabad accord, called for the militias to be disarmed but was never fully implemented. Through 1993, Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami forces, allied with the Shi'a Hezb-i-Wahdat militia, clashed intermittently with Rabbani and Masood's Jamiat forces. Cooperating with Jamiat were militants of Sayyaf's Ittehad-i-Islami and, periodically, troops loyal to ethnic Uzbek strongman Abdul Rashid Dostam. On January 1, 1994, Dostam switched sides, precipitating large-scale fighting in Kabul and in northern provinces, which caused thousands of civilian casualties in Kabul and elsewhere and created a new wave of displaced persons and refugees. The central government exercises only limited control over the countryside, where local leaders and militia commanders, some with only nominal allegiance to any of the national figures battling for power in Kabul, hold sway. A date for elections in Afghanistan has yet to be established. Principal Government Officials President--Burhanuddin Rabbani Prime Minister--Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Minister of Finance--Abdul Karim Khalili Minister of Foreign Affairs--Hidayat Amin Arsala Charge d'Affaires to the U.S.--Abdul Rahim Afghanistan maintains an embassy in the United States at 2341 Wyoming Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202- 234-3770/71/72). ECONOMY Historically, there has been a dearth of information and reliable statistics about Afghanistan's economy. This was exacerbated by the Soviet invasion and ensuing civil war, which destroyed much of the underdeveloped country's infrastructure and disrupted normal patterns of economic activity. Agriculture The Afghan economy continues to be overwhelmingly agricultural, despite the fact that only 15% of its total land area is arable and less than 6% currently is cultivated. Agricultural production is constrained by an almost total dependence on erratic winter snows and spring rains for water; irrigation is primitive. Relatively little use is made of machines, chemical fertilizer, or pesticides. Grain production is Afghanistan's traditional agricultural mainstay. Overall agricultural production declined an average of 3.5% per year between 1978 and 1990. This can be attributed to sustained fighting, instability in rural areas, prolonged drought, and deteriorated infrastructure. Soviet efforts to disrupt production in resistance-dominated areas also contributed to this decline. Furthermore, Soviet efforts to centralize the economy through state ownership and control and consolidation of farmland into large collective farms contributed to lower production. The war against the Soviet Union and the ensuing civil war also led to migration to the cities and refugee flight to Pakistan and Iran, further disrupting normal agricultural production. Recent studies indicate that agricultural production and livestock numbers are less than one-half of what they were in 1978. It is estimated that Afghanistan's food production levels are about 15% lower than what is necessary to feed the population. Shortages are exacerbated by the country's already limited transportation network, which has deteriorated due to damage and neglect resulting from war and the absence of an effective central government. Opium is increasingly becoming a source of cash for many Afghans, especially since the breakdown in central authority after the Soviet withdrawal. Opium is easy to cultivate and transport and offers a quick source of income for returning refugees and other impoverished Afghans. Afghanistan is the second-largest producer of raw opium in the world, after Burma. In 1993, despite efforts by the U.S. and others to encourage alternative crops, poppy and opium production increased 8% and 7%, respectively, from a year earlier. Much of Afghanistan's opium production is shipped to laboratories in Pakistan and refined into heroin which is either consumed by a growing South Asian addict population or exported, primarily to Europe and North America. Trade and Industry Trade accounts for a small portion of the Afghan economy, and there are no reliable statistics relating to trade flows. Since the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Soviet Union, other limited trade relationships appear to be emerging with Iran, Pakistan, and the West. Afghanistan trades little with the United States; its 1992 trade is estimated at $6 million. Afghanistan does not enjoy U.S. most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status, which was revoked in 1986. Afghanistan is endowed with a wealth of natural resources, including extensive deposits of coal, salt, chromium, iron ore, gold, fluorite, talc, copper, and lapis lazuli. Unfortunately, the country's remote and rugged terrain, and inadequate transportation network, usually have made mining these resources unprofitable. The most important resource has been natural gas, first tapped in 1967. At their peak during the 1980s, natural gas sales accounted for $300 million a year in export revenues (56% of the total). Ninety percent of these exports went to the Soviet Union to pay for imports and debts. However, during the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Afghanistan's natural gas fields were capped to prevent sabotage by the mujahidin. Restoration of gas production has been hampered by internal strife and the disruption of traditional trading relationships following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Transportation Landlocked Afghanistan has no rail-ways, but the Amu Darya (Oxus) River, which forms part of Afghanistan's border with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, has barge traffic. During their occupation of the country, the Soviets completed a bridge across the Amu Darya and built a motor vehicle and railroad bridge between Termez and Jeyretan. Most roadbuilding occurred in the 1960s, funded by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Soviets built a road and tunnel through the Salang Pass in 1964, connecting northern and southern Afghanistan. A highway connecting the principal cities of Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul forms the primary road system. The highway system requires significant reconstruction, and regional roads are in a state of disrepair. The poor state of the Afghan transportation and communication networks has further fragmented and hobbled the struggling economy. Economic Development and Recovery Afghanistan embarked on a modest economic development program in the 1930s. The government founded banks, introduced paper money, established a university, expanded primary, secondary, and technical schools, and sent students abroad for education. In 1956, the Afghan Government promulgated the first in a long series of ambitious development plans. By the late 1970s, these had achieved only mixed results due to flaws in the planning process as well as inadequate funding and a shortage of the skilled managers and technicians needed for implementation. These constraints on development have been exacerbated by the flight of refugees and the disruption and instability stemming from the Soviet occupation and ensuing civil war. Today, economic recovery and long-term development will depend on establishing an effective and stable political system. The UN and the international donor community continue to provide considerable humanitarian relief. Since its inception in 1988, the umbrella UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) has channeled $512 million in multilateral cash assistance to Afghan refugees and vulnerable per-sons inside Afghanistan. The U.S. and Japan are the leading contributors to this relief effort. One of its key tasks is to eliminate from priority areas (such as villages, arable fields, and roads) some of the estimated 10 million land-mines which continue to litter the Afghan landscape. Afghanistan is the most heavily mined country in the world; mine-related injuries number up to 100 per month. Without successful mine clearance, refugee repatriation, political stability, and economic reconstruction will be severely constrained. The UN, through the UN Development Program (UNDP), is expected to play a major role in post-war recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan. In November 1993, the UNDP Action Plan for the Immediate Rehabilitation of Afghanistan identified more than $600 million in quick- impact development projects which could be implemented within two years where security conditions permit. FOREIGN RELATIONS Before the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan pursued a policy of neutrality and nonalignment in its foreign relations. In international forums, Afghanistan generally followed the voting patterns of Asian and African non-aligned countries. Following the Marxist coup of April 1978, the Taraki Government developed significantly closer ties with the Soviet Union and its communist satellites. After the December 1979 invasion, Afghanistan's foreign policy mirrored that of the Soviet Union. Afghan foreign policy-makers attempted, with little success, to increase their regime's low standing in the non-communist world. With the signing of the Geneva accords, Najibullah unsuccessfully sought to end Afghanistan's isolation within the Islamic world and in the Non-Aligned Movement. Most Western countries, including the United States, maintained small diplomatic missions in Kabul during the Soviet occupation. Many subsequently closed their missions due to instability and heavy fighting in Kabul. Although a few states have reestablished a diplomatic presence in Kabul, most embassies, including that of the United States, remain closed. Pakistan Two areas--Pashtunistan and Baluchistan--have long complicated Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan. Controversies involving these areas date back to the establishment of the Durand Line in 1893 dividing Pashtun and Baluch tribes living in Afghanistan from those living in what later became Pakistan. Afghanistan vigorously protested the inclusion of Pashtun and Baluch areas within Pakistan without providing the inhabitants with an opportunity for self-determination. Since 1947, this problem has led to incidents along the border, with extensive disruption of normal trade patterns. The most serious crisis lasted from September 1961 to June 1963, when diplomatic, trade, transit, and consular relations between the countries were suspended. The 1978 Marxist coup further strained relations between the two countries. Pakistan took the lead diplomatically in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in opposing the Soviet occupation. During the war against the Soviet occupation, Pakistan served as the primary logistical conduit for the Afghan resistance. Pakistan, aided by UN agencies, private groups, and many friendly countries, continues to provide refuge to about 1.4 million Afghans. Much of Afghanistan remains dependent on Pakistani links for trade and travel to the outside world, and Pakistan views Afghanistan as eventually becoming its primary route for trade with Central Asia. Iran Afghanistan's relations with Iran have fluctuated over the years, with periodic disputes over the water rights of the Helmand River as the main issue of contention. Following the Soviet invasion, which Iran opposed, relations deteriorated. The Iranian consulate in Herat closed, as did the Afghan consulate in Mashhad. The Iranians complained of periodic border violations following the Soviet invasion. In 1985, they urged feuding Afghan Shi'a resistance groups to unite to oppose the Soviets. Iran supported the cause of the Afghan resistance and provided limited financial and military assistance to rebel leaders who pledged loyalty to the Iranian vision of Islamic revolution. Iran provides refuge to about 2 million Afghans. Russia In the 19th century, Afghanistan served as a strategic buffer state between czarist Russia and the British Empire in the sub-continent. Afghanistan's relations with Moscow became more cordial after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet Union was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan after the Third Anglo-Afghan war and signed an Afghan-Soviet non-aggression pact in 1921, which also provided for Afghan transit rights through the Soviet Union. Early Soviet assistance included financial aid, aircraft and attendant technical personnel, and telegraph operators. The Soviets began a major economic assistance program in Afghanistan in the 1950s. Between 1954 and 1978, Afghanistan received more than $1 billion in Soviet aid, including substantial military assistance. In 1973, the two countries announced a $200-million assistance agreement on gas and oil development, trade, transport, irrigation, and factory construction. Following the 1979 invasion, the Soviets augmented their large aid commitments to shore up the Afghan economy and rebuild the Afghan military. They provided the Karmal regime an unprecedented $800 million. The Soviet Union supported the Najibullah regime even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989. Today, unresolved questions concerning Soviet MIA/POWs in Afghanistan remain an issue between Russia and Afghanistan. Tajik rebels based in Afghanistan in July 1993 attacked a Russian border outpost in Tajikistan, killing 25 Russians and prompting Russian retaliatory strikes which caused extensive damage in northern Afghanistan. Reports of Afghan support for the Tajik rebels have led to cool relations between the two countries. Tajikistan Afghanistan's relations with newly independent Tajikistan have been complicated by ongoing political upheaval and civil war in Tajikistan which spurred some 100,000 Tajiks to seek refuge in Afghanistan in late 1992 and early 1993. Tajik rebels seeking to overthrow the regime of Russian-backed former communist Imamali Rahmanov began operating from Afghan bases and recruiting Tajik refugees into their ranks. These rebels, reportedly aided by Afghans and a number of foreign Islamic extremists, conduct cross-border raids against Russian and Tajik security posts and seek to infiltrate fighters and materiel from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS The first extensive American contact with Afghanistan was made by Josiah Harlan, an adventurer from Pennsylvania who was an adviser in Afghan politics in the 1830s and reputedly inspired Rudyard Kipling's story, "The Man Who Would be King." After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1934, the U.S. policy of helping developing nations raise their standard of living was an important factor in maintaining and improving U.S.-Afghan ties. From 1950 to 1979, U.S. foreign assistance provided Afghanistan with more than $500 million in loans, grants, and surplus agricultural commodities to develop transportation facilities, increase agricultural production, expand the educational system, stimulate industry, and improve government administration. In the 1950s, the U.S. declined Afghanistan's request for defense cooperation but extended an economic assistance program focused on the development of Afghanistan's physical infrastructure--roads, dams, and power plants. Later, U.S. aid shifted from infrastructure projects to technical assistance programs to help develop the skills needed to build a modern economy. The Peace Corps was active in Afghanistan between 1962 and 1979. After the April 1978 coup, relations deteriorated. In February 1979, U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs was murdered after Afghan security forces burst in on his kidnapers. The U.S. then reduced bilateral assistance and terminated a small military training program. All remaining assistance agreements were ended after the Soviet invasion. Following the Soviet invasion, the United States supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a Soviet withdrawal. In addition, generous U.S. contributions to the refugee program in Pakistan played a major part in efforts to assist Afghans in need. U.S. efforts also included helping Afghans living inside Afghanistan. This cross-border humanitarian assistance program increased Afghan self-sufficiency and helped Afghans resist Soviet attempts to drive civilians out of the rebel-dominated countryside. During the period of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the U.S. provided about $3 billion in military and economic assistance to Afghans and the resistance movement. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was closed in January 1989 for security reasons. The U.S. has supported the peaceful emergence of a broad-based government representative of all Afghans and has been active in encouraging a UN role in the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The U.S. provides financial aid for mine-clearing activities and other humanitarian assistance to Afghans through international organizations. In addition to the efforts of the UN and other donors, the U.S. has provided $328 million in direct bilateral assistance to Afghanistan since 1985 through its cross- border program based in Islamabad, Pakistan. However, assistance levels have fallen dramatically in recent years due to overall budgetary constraints in the U.S. and the difficulties inherent in administering a cross- border aid program. For these reasons, the program is scheduled for closure by the end of 1994. UN EFFORTS During the Soviet occupation, the United Nations was highly critical of the U.S.S.R.'s interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and was instrumental in obtaining a negotiated Soviet withdrawal under the terms of the Geneva accords. In the aftermath of the accords and subsequent Soviet withdrawal, the United Nations has assisted in the repatriation of refugees and has provided humanitarian aid such as health care, educational programs, and food and has supported mine-clearing operations. The UNDP and associated agencies have undertaken a limited number of development projects. However, the UN reduced its role in Afghanistan in 1992 in the wake of fierce factional strife in and around Kabul. The UN Secretary General has designated a personal representative to head the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) and the Office of the Secretary General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP), both based in Islamabad, Pakistan. TRAVEL NOTES Travel advisory: The U.S. Department of State warns all U.S. citizens not to travel to Afghanistan. Westerners remain vulnerable to politically and criminally motivated attacks and violence, including robbery, kidnaping, and hostage-taking. Landmines are still prevalent throughout the countryside. There is no U.S. embassy in Afghanistan, and no other diplomatic mission represents U.S. interests or provides consular services. Climate and clothing: Kabul's climate is similar to Denver's, but drier and dustier. Winter lasts from December through February; summer, mid-May to mid- September. Because of cultural sensitivities, conservative attire is essential. Customs: Visas required. No immunization requirements at present, but this is subject to change. Check latest information. Health: No health controls or sanitation regulations govern the safety of foods in markets and restaurants. Travelers and foreign residents are advised to boil drinking water, cook fruits, vegetables, and meats thoroughly, and not to consume local dairy products. Transportation: Ariana Airlines provides international flights to and from Afghanistan. Bakhtar Airlines provides internal flights between Kabul and regional centers such as Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kandahar. Taxis are available in Kabul; buses are often overcrowded and uncomfortable. Telecommunications: The reliability of telecommunications into and out of Afghanistan is erratic at best. Kabul is 9-1/2 hours ahead of Eastern standard time. Commercial cables from the U.S. may take several days to arrive under the best of circumstances. Published by the United States Department of State -- Bureau of Public Affairs -- Office of Public Communication -- Washington, DC Managing Editor: Peter Knecht -- Editor: Peter Freeman Department of State Publication 7795 -- Background Notes Series For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.